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JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, LEGITIMACY, AND
THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
A COMMENT
Frank  L  Michelman*
INTRODUCTION
My  aims in this  Comment  are modest and primarily exegetical:  to
assemble  what John Rawls  says about the question  of judicial  review,
and to resolve  two apparent  puzzles posed by his remarks bearing  on
this  question.  The  remarks  I  have  in mind  are  all  found  in  Rawls's
book Political  Liberalism,' mainly  in Sections  52 and  63  ("The  Idea of
Constitutional  Essentials"  and  "The  Supreme  Court  as  Exemplar  of
Public Reason")  of Lecture VI ("The Idea of Public Reason").4  It is
chiefly in these  pages that Rawls reflects on whether and how judicial
review  may  comport  with  a  certain  political  conception  of  justice,'
namely,  the  one  he  calls  "justice  as  fairness"  and  commends  as
morally apt for our society.6
By "the  question of judicial  review"  I mean simply the  question  of
having  judicial  review  or  not.  It is  not  so  easy,  alas,  to  say  exactly
what "judicial  review"  is,7  but  a crude definition  will serve our needs
here.  Judicial  review,  we'll  say,  exists  in  a  country's  political-
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1.  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996).
2.  See id. at 227-30.
3.  See id. at 231-40.
4.  I have addressed  these texts in writing twice  before. See  Frank I.  Michelman,
On  Regulating Practices with  Theories Drawn from  Them:  A  Case of Justice as
Fairness,  in Nomos 37, Theory and Practice 325-36 (1. Shapiro & J. DeCew eds.,  1995)
[hereinafter  Michelman,  Regulating  Practices]; Frank  I.  Michelman,  Rawls  on
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law,  in The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Rawls
394, 403-07  (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003)  [hereinafter Michelman,  Constitutional  Law].
5.  On the meaning of this term, see  Michelman,  Constitutional  Law, supra note
4,  at 398-400.
6.  See id.
7.  For  discussions  of the possible  dimensions  of  variation  for  a judicial  review
practice, see Michelman, Regulating Practices,  supra note 4,  at 325-26;  Mark Tushnet,
New  Forms of Judicial Review  and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based
Worries, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813 (2003).
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institutional  practice  when  (a)  questions  of  the  constitutionality  of
legislation  are  regularly brought  before  courts for resolution;  (b)  the
courts  address  these  questions  afresh,  with  a  substantial  degree  of
independence  from the explicit or implicit opinions of other agents in
the  system  including  those  who  enacted  the  questioned  law;  (c)  the
resulting judgments  of jurisdictionally competent  courts  are regarded
as  binding  on  other  departments  of  government  unless  and  until
revised  either  by judicial  decision  or  by  constitutional  amendment;
and  (d)  the result of a judicial declaration of a legislative enactment's
unconstitutionality  is  that  the  enactment  thenceforth  is  treated  as
invalid, voided of the force of law.8
I.  SETTING THE STAGE:  LEGAL DUALISM AND LIBERAL
LEGITIMACY
A.  Constitutional-Legal  Dualism
The question of judicial  review arises only with respect  to political
and  legal  systems  that  are  "dualist"  in  a  sense  conveyed  by  Rawls
when  he  writes  that  "constitutional  democracy  is  dualist:  it
distinguishes  ...  the higher law of the people from the ordinary law of
legislative  bodies."9  The  liberal political order envisioned  in Political
Liberalism  undoubtedly  is  constitutional-democratic  and  dualist.
Justice  as  fairness  calls  for  substantive  limits  and  constraints  on
lawmaking, including requirements concerning "equal basic rights and
liberties  of citizenship that legislative majorities  are to respect,""l  and
Rawls plainly expects  that a society well-ordered  by  the standards of
justice as fairness will treat these  requirements as higher law to which
ordinary  lawmaking  is  beholden.1  Thus,  the  stage  is  set  for  the
possible  entrance  of  judicial  review.  And  yet  the  play  of
constitutional  democracy  quite  conceivably  could  go  on  without
judicial  review,  as  we  soon  shall  see.  (If it  could  not,  the  judicial
review  question  would  already  be  settled  in  the  affirmative  by  the
commitment  of political liberalism to constitutional democracy,  which
Rawls plainly does not think is the case.) 2
8.  These conditions describe  a species of what Professor Tushnet calls  "[sitrong-
form judicial review." Tushnet, supra note 7, at 815.
9.  Rawls, Political  Liberalism, supra note 1, at 233.
10.  Id. at  227; see id. at  291,  294-99  (explaining  the  "special  status"  of the  basic
liberties associated with the first principle of justice).
11.  See id. at 233.
12.  As  I  show  in  Part  II.A.,  Rawls  maintains  that  justice  as  fairness  does  not
necessarily  entail  judicial  review.  He  still  might  think  constitutional  democracy
necessarily  entails  it.  That  would  be  possible,  however,  only  if  Rawls  were  not
presupposing constitutional  democracy as  a feature  of any political-liberal  regime  or
any regime that carries out justice as fairness. See, e.g., infra note 32.  To my mind, the
better  reading  is  that  Rawls  is  presupposing  constitutional  democracy  in  his
reflections on judicial review.  For Rawls, the connection  between  political liberalism
and  constitutional  democracy  is  about  as  deep  as  it  can  get.  Rawls  poses  the
1408 [Vol. 72QUESTION OF  JUDICIAL REVIEW
B.  Validation and Legitimation: Two Functions of Constitutional  Law
in Rawlsian Constitutional  Democracy
In the kind of dualist system envisioned  by Rawls,  it  is understood
that  not  every  series  of  events  conforming  to  the  accepted,  formal
protocols  for  an  act  of  lawmaking-for  example,  duly  registered
approvals  of a law-like  text by  majorities of quorums of both Houses
of Congress and  by the President-necessarily  produces  true or valid
law, meaning minimally a norm or rule to which anyone purporting to
be  law-abiding  is expected thenceforth  to conform his or her actions.
There  is in  place  a  higher  level  of law-constitutional  law-and  the
legal validity of the new enactment  depends on the conformity of the
latter's content, not just its procedural pedigree, to the demands of the
higher  law. 3   To  be  clear,  the  claim  here  is  not  that  this  result-
unconstitutional  legislative  enactments  fail  to  produce  valid  law-
follows  logically  and  strictly  from  the  very  idea  of  dualism  and  the
"higherness"  of  constitutional  law. 4  Whether  it  does  or  not  is  a
question  we  need  not  settle  here-interesting  as  it  may  be  to
jurisprudence-because  the claim here  is only that the  result follows
in the kind of dualist system envisioned by Rawls.
Rawls  understands  law  to  be  a  medium  always  fraught  with  the
potential for coercion.  How, then, he asks,  is it possible that schemes
of social ordering by law may be morally permissible and perceived as
such by  all?  How may a regime  of coercive,  majoritarian  lawmaking
possibly  be justified  among citizens  presumed  to  regard  themselves
and  each  other  as  individually  "free  and  equal?"'5  Rawls  answers
with the proposition  he dubs "the liberal principle of legitimacy,"16  in
which legal dualism figures crucially:
[Olur exercise  of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when  it is exercised  in  accordance  with  a constitution  the essentials
"problem"  of political liberalism  as  one  of "work[ing]  out a political  conception  of
justice for a... constitutional  democratic regime."  Rawls, Political  Liberalism, supra
note 1, at xl-xli.  His apparent assumption throughout  his work on justice has been, as
he wrote  in an early essay, that "a  constitutional  democracy  of some sort is required
by  the  principles  of  justice."  John  Rawls,  The  Justification of Civil Disobedience
(1969),  reprinted in  John  Rawls:  Collected  Papers  176,  180  (Samuel  Freeman  ed.,
1999).
13.  I discuss  the relations between  legal validity  and constitutional  law in greater
detail  in  Frank  I. Michelman,  Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8  Rev.
Const.  Stud.  (forthcoming  2003)  [hereinafter  Michelman,  Contract]; Frank  I.
Michelman,  Living With  Judicial Supremacy, 38  Wake  Forest  L. Rev.  579,  588-93
(2003) [hereinafter  Michelman, Judicial  Supremacy].
14.  Given  dualism,  legislators  who  enact  legislative  content  in  contravention  of
standing  constitutional  law  no  doubt  act  contrary  to  law,  but  perhaps  it  does  not
follow  from that premise that  the ostensible legal  products of their actions must lack
validity as law.  Few of us, on reflection,  will doubt that unlawful actions can alter the
state of the social or the legal world.
15.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 136-37, 217.
16.  Id. at 137, 217.
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of which  all citizens  may reasonably  be  expected  to endorse  in  the
light of principles  and  ideals  acceptable  to  them  as  reasonable and
rational.  This is the liberal principle of legitimacy. 17
We  need  not  delve just  now  into  the  precise  meanings  of  all  the
load-bearing  terms in this proposition.18  All we need  is awareness  of
three points.  First, the "essentials"  of a constitution include certain of
its particular formulations (typically  in a bill of rights)  of those "equal
basic  rights  and  liberties,"  already  mentioned,  which  "legislative
majorities  are  to  respect."' 9   Second,  to  say  that  a  given  set  of
constitutional  essentials  is  acceptable  to  everyone  viewed  as
reasonable  and rational  is  tantamount  to saying that the set matches
up acceptably  with  certain  principles  laid down  by  Rawls  under the
name  of justice  as  fairness." 0  Third,  by "legitimacy"  Rawls  means  a
certain  sort  of  virtue  in  the  system  or  "general  structure  of...
authority"21  by which  laws  in a given  country are brought  into being.
To call such a system legitimate is to say that moral justification  exists
to enforce whatever laws may issue from that system against everyone
alike,  including  persons  who  may  deeply,  considerately,  and
reasonably  disagree with the justice or the prudence  of some of those
laws.22
The  "liberal  principle  of legitimacy"  posits a  necessary condition 3
for the legitimacy  of any system of government by law, constitutional
democracy  being  one  type of  such  a  system.  Such  a  system  can  be
legitimate,  in the  sense that all  the  laws issuing from the  system can
justifiably  be  enforced  against  everyone  including  those  who
reasonably  regard  them as  bad and  wrong, on  condition that certain
"essential"  components  of the system are what they morally  ought to
be"4-which  for Rawls means they are compliant with the principles of
justice as fairness.
Obviously, though, legitimacy cannot be decided merely by looking
to  see  whether  some  written  instrument  headed  "Constitution"
contains  a list of "essentials,"  including  basic-liberties guarantees,  that
appear  to honor correct principles of justice.  The question always will
17.  Id. at 217; see also id. at 137 (offering a like formulation).
18.  I do  so in  Michelman,  Contract, supra note  13;  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Relative
Constraint  and Public Reason: What Is "The Work  We Expect of Law?,"  67 Brook.  L.
Rev. 963, 971-75 (2002)  [hereinafter Michelman, Public  Reason].
19.  Supra text  accompanying  note  10;  see Michelman,  Constitutional Law, supra
note 4, at 403-06 (discussing  "constitutional essentials").
20.  See  Michelman,  Constitutional  Law, supra note 4, at  398-400;  Rawls, Political
Liberalism,  supra note  1,  at  291-92  (setting  forth  the  two  principles  of  justice  as
fairness and elaborating on the first principle).
21.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 136.
22.  See id. at 216-17; Michelman, Contract,  supra  note  13.
23.  Rawls, Political  Liberalism, supra note 1, at 137.  Rawls says coercive  political
power  is  justified  "only"  when  this condition  is  met. See  supra text  accompanying
note 17.
24.  See Michelman, Contract,  supra note 13.
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be whether  such essentials are put  effectively  into practice.  But they
are  not  put  effectively  into  practice  if  and  insofar  as  legislative
enactments in apparent violation of them are freely given effect as law
by being, as we commonly say, "enforced."  In other words, the liberal
principle  of  legitimacy  proposed  by  Rawls  is  satisfied  only  on
condition  that  the  constitution  provides  what  it  morally  ought  to
provide  and  legislative  enactments  found  at  variance  with
constitutional  requirements  are effectively  voided  of force.25  That is
why  I say  invalidity must  follow from  unconstitutionality  in the  kind
of constitutional-democratic,  dualist system envisioned by Rawls-the
relevant,  key  feature  of  such  a  system  being  its  reliance  on  the
effective  rule of morally meritorious  constitutional  law as a guarantor
of the moral supportability  of the system of legal  governance  in force
in the country.
C.  Therefore, Judicial  Review?
At this point, it may seem that there  is for Rawls  only one possible
answer to the question of judicial review:  Political morality  demands
it because  political morality encompasses legitimacy,26  and legitimacy,
Rawls  says,  depends  on  ascertainable  compliance  by  all  ordinary
lawmaking with (morally adequate)  constitutional  law.  True  as  both
those claims  may  be, however,  they do not logically  compel  a choice
in  favor  of  judicial  review.  What-and  all-they  require  is  that
certain  norms be  accepted  as  higher  law,  ascertained  deviation  from
which  renders other  acts of lawmaking  non-valid.  It does not follow
that any  court of judges  must or should be empowered  to decide the
constitutionality  of  procedurally  proper  acts  of  lawmaking.  Other
alternatives  plainly  are available, at least conceptually.  For example,
it might be  the legislature's office  to judge the  validity of its pending
enactments  vis-a-vis  constitutional  requirements,  and  it  might  be the
electorate's office  to send packing legislators whom the electors judge
to be shirking or mishandling that responsibility.
25.  Here we must note  a possible refinement.  One may take the view that a norm
can  be valid law although no court or other official  actor stands ready to "enforce"  it
or attach any punitive or other material consequence to non-compliance.  Norms that
are  in  that  sense non-enforceable  may  still  be  regarded  as  legally  binding  on  their
addressees  in  the  sense  that anyone  who  flouts them  without  special  justification  is
blamable  for contempt  of the  law.  See,  e.g.,  Michelman,  Judicial Supremacy, supra
note  13,  at  592.  There  thus remains  a  possible  sense  of the  term  "legal  validity"
according  to  which  the  Rawlsian  liberal  principle  of  legitimacy  might  allow  an
unconstitutional  legislative  enactment  to  produce  "valid"  law,  although  not  law  to
whose  violation  any  adverse,  material  consequence  may  permissibly  be  attached.
Since Rawls's  reflections  on judicial review  take no cognizance  of such a  possibility,
we safely may set it aside.
26.  Legitimacy,  remember,  is  defined  as  the moral  justifiability  of  "the  general
structure  of authority"  by  which  citizens  direct  coercive  political  power  upon  each
other. Rawls, Political  Liberalism, supra note  1, at  136; see supra text accompanying
notes 15-22.
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Legislatures  and  electorates  no  doubt  may  fail  and  err  in
performing such  offices, and  the  result then  (lacking judicial  review)
will be jeopardy to the Rawlsian  legitimacy of the political order.  But
so  may  judges  fail  and  err-not just  by  mistakenly  giving  effect  to
enactments that really do violate morally apt constitutional essentials,
but by mistakenly invalidating  enactments  demanded  by  morally  apt
constitutional  essentials-and  the  result  if courts  do  thus  err will be
the  same,  that  is,  jeopardy  to  legitimacy.  Further  complicating
matters are the  following two possibilities:  first, that among a  set of
just constitutional essentials belongs a guarantee of the right of people
to rule themselves  politically  and this right  is infringed  by subjection
to  judicial  review;27  second,  that  the  presence  of  judicial  review
disastrously  saps the will of legislators  and electorates  to look out for
constitutional violations. 2"  On these grounds  and others that do not in
any way contradict Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy,  generations
of Americans  from the founding  onward29  have  questioned  both the
necessity  of judicial  review  for  constitutional-democratic  justice  and
the  compatibility  of  judicial  review  with  constitutional-democratic
prudence.  Many  Americans do so today,3" and their arguments  show,
at least, that these are fairly debatable questions.
II.  RAWLS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW:  TWO PUZZLES
A.  A Pragmatic  Stance Towards Judicial  Review
Rawls apparently  agrees  that the  questions  are debatable.  At any
rate, he forbears  from undertaking  finally  to resolve  them.  He  does
rally to the support of judicial review, but only to the limited extent of
defending  it against  charges  that  the  practice  cannot  reasonably  be
thought  to  advance  the  aims  of constitutional  democracy-because,
say,  it  is  anti-democratic  or  anti-populist  in  principle.  Rawls  finds
such  charges  unsustainable  as  long  as judicial  decisions  "reasonably
accord  with  the  constitution...  and  with  its  amendments  and
politically  mandated  interpretations,"  on  the  theory  that,  in  such  a
case,  whatever  constitutional  law  the  reviewing  court  enforces  may
fairly be said to emanate  from  "the higher authority of the people."'"
27.  See,  e.g.,  Michelman,  Regulating Practices, supra note  4,  at  327-29;  Jeremy
Waldron,  A  Right-Based Critique of Constitutional  Rights, 13  Oxford  J. Legal  Stud.
18,  18-20 (1993).
28.  The locus classicus is James B. Thayer,  The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine  of Constitutional  Law, 7  Harv.  L. Rev. 129 (1893).
29.  See 2 The Anti-Federalist  No. 15, at 437, 440 (Brutus) (H.J. Storing ed., 1981).
30.  Leading  contemporary  works  in  this  vein  include  Larry  D.  Kramer,  The
People  Themselves:  Popular  Constitutionalism  and  Judicial  Review  (forthcoming
2004);  Mark  Tushnet, Taking the  Constitution Away from the Courts (1999);  Jeremy
Waldron,  Law  and  Disagreement  (1999).  Kramer,  supra, is  devoted  largely  to  a
history of the American controversy over judicial review.
31.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 234.
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It  will  be  primarily  up  to  the  people  to  direct  their  higher,
constitution-making  authority as justice requires.  Supposing they  do
so (as Rawls surely is entitled to suppose when presenting a normative
account of justice in a constitutional-democratic  society), the resulting
constitution will "specif[y]  a just political procedure and incorporate[]
restrictions  which  both  protect  the  basic  liberties  and  secure  their
priority,"  and  a  constitution  of  that  type  "allows  a  place  for  the
institution of judicial review."32  This all amounts to  a claim by Rawls
that judicial review may be an on-the-whole  effective way to carry out
the legitimacy  principle's  demand for  assurance  of the compliance of
ordinary  lawmaking  with  a  just  set  of  constitutional  essentials.
However,  he  does  not hold  it  to  be  the  only  way,  or the  way  that
necessarily  is  always  and  everywhere  best.  Judicial  review,  Rawls
concludes,  "can  perhaps  be  defended  given  certain  historical
circumstances  and conditions  of political  culture."33  That is  as far  as
he  goes.  In  sum,  it  is  plain that for Rawls,  a  choice  against judicial
review,  while  it  might  in  some  circumstances  be  prudentially  ill-
advised  for  persons  concerned  about  liberal  legitimacy,  would  not
ipso facto, at all times and places, be a choice against a political-liberal
conception of justice.34
B.  The First  Puzzle
So far, Rawls's  stance appears  clear and unequivocal.  To say, as he
does,  that  justice  as  fairness  can  take  judicial  review  or  leave  it,
depending  on  the  circumstances,  is  not  to equivocate;  it is  rather  to
take  a stand.  Judicial review being neither always  required by justice
nor always excluded by justice (so goes Rawls's claim), the question of
having  it or  not is  a  pragmatic  one to  be  made  with certain justice-
related concerns in view.
An appearance  of equivocation  may nevertheless enter the picture
when  we  take  a  closer  look  at  Rawls's  category  of  constitutional
essentials.  Let us use the term "requirements  of justice"  to cover all
the  substantive  demands  contained  in  the  two  principles  of justice.
These demands  include  not only the  basic-liberties  guarantee  of  the
first principle  but  the  resource-distributional  demands  of the  second
principle,  those  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity  and  of  the  so-called
difference  principle  permitting  only  such  inequalities  as  may  be
conducive  to  the  benefit  of  "the  least  advantaged  members  of
32.  Id. at 339.  But Rawls alsd stretches so far in the other direction as to allow for
the possibility that a non-dualist regime of "parliamentary  supremacy with  no bill of
rights" might be  the "superior"  choice  from the standpoint of political liberalism. Id.
at 234-35.
33.  Id. at 240.
34.  This  conclusion  resembles  that  of  Ronald  Dworkin.  See  Ronald  Dworkin,
Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 33-35 (1996).
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society."35  In  Rawls's  view,  a  political  system  is  unjust  insofar  as  it
fails  to ensure  the  application  of public reason  to legislative  choices
affecting  the  satisfaction  of  any  of  the  requirements  of justice,  not
merely  insofar  as  it  fails  to  ensure  public  reason's  application  to
choices  affecting  the  basic  liberties.36  It does  not  follow, though,  in
Rawls's view, that every requirement of justice should be made into a
requirement of constitutional law.  Rawls's name for the requirements
of  justice  that  do  belong  in  constitutional  law  is  "constitutional
essentials."37   He  includes  in  that  category  certain  guarantees
respecting basic liberties, while excluding from it certain distributional
norms (those  of the second principle)  which he  nevertheless holds to
be requirements  of justice. 3"
Notice the consequence when we recall Rawls's proposition that the
coercive  exercise  of democratic  political  authority is morally justified
only as long as it conforms  to a proper  set of constitutional essentials
(the  "liberal  principle  of  legitimacy").39  Combining  this  with  the
exclusion of the  second  principle's  resource-distribution  norms  from
the constitutional essentials, but also keeping in mind the inclusion  of
those  norms  in  the  aims  towards  which  a  political  practice  must
honestly  and  constantly  strive  in  order  to  satisfy justice,  we  get  the
result,of  a possible  gap  between  legitimacy  and justice.  A "general
structure  of  authority"4  may  be  simultaneously  legitimate-morally
deserving  to have  its  laws  complied  with-and  deviant  from justice.
Such a structure  is legitimate, Rawls says, if it observably  and reliably
screens  out  lawmaking  choices incompatible  with  any  basic-liberties
guarantee contained  among the constitutional essentials,  but it also is
unjust insofar  as it may fail to strive credibly  and in good faith toward
fulfillment  of  the  resource-distributional  demands  of  justice  as
fairness.
There  is nothing wrong or untoward  about allowing in this way for
the  possibility  of  legitimacy  in  a  governmental  system  whose
performance  observably  fails  to  measure  up  to  justice.  For  what
purpose,  after  all,  do  we  employ  the  term  "legitimate,"  if  not  to
convey the complex judgment that a governmental system in the dock,
so to speak, for its clear shortfalls from justice continues nevertheless
to  merit  loyalty.4'  On  the  other  hand,  the  justice-legitimacy  gap
35.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra  note 1, at 291.
36.  See Michelman, Constitutional  Law, supra note 4, at 400-03.  On the bearing of
public reason, see Michelman, Public  Reason, supra note 18, at 975-78.
37.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note  1, at 227-30.
38.  See id.  There are certain  exceptions to this generalization, and  we shall come
to them. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
39.  See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
40.  See supra text accompanying note 21.
41.  See  Michelman,  Contract, supra note  13;  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Ida's Way:
Constructing  the Respect-Worthy Governmental System,  72 Fordham  L. Rev. 345, 357-
58 (2003)  [hereinafter Michelman,  Ida's Way].
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normally strikes us as something we have little choice but to accept in
a partially  fallen  world,4 2  not as  something  we  positively  cherish  and
therefore  seek  to  introduce  or  preserve  when  it  might  be  avoided.
Some  cogent  explanation  therefore  is  required  for  excluding
distributional  guarantees  from  the  legitimacy  principle  even  as  we
insist on their figuring vigorously in the justice principle.
The puzzle I am driving at arises with Rawls's  response to this need
for  an  explanation.  His  response  is,  in  fact,  somewhat  complex,
although very compactly stated.43  Rawls writes:
Whether  the  constitutional  essentials  covering  the  basic  freedoms
are  satisfied  is more  or  less  visible  on  the  face  of  constitutional
arrangements  and  how these can be  seen  to  work in  practice.  But
whether  the  aims  of the  principles  covering  social  and  economic
inequalities  are  realized  is  far  more  difficult  to  ascertain.  These
matters  are  nearly  always  open  to  wide  differences  of reasonable
opinion; they rest on complicated inferences and intuitive judgments
that require  us  to  assess  complex  social  and economic  information
about  topics  poorly  understood.  Thus,...  we  can  expect  more
agreement  about  whether  the  principles  for  the  basic  rights  and
liberties  are  realized  than  about  whether  the  principles  for  social
and  economic  justice  are  realized.  This  is not  a  difference  about
what  are  the  correct  principles  but  simply  a  difference  in  the
difficulty of seeing whether the principles are achieved. 44
For  an  American  constitutional  lawyer  or  law  professor  reading
those  words,  what  immediately  comes  to  mind  is  a  justiciability
worry-which is to say, a worry about the suitability of a norm or class
of  norms  for  judicial application.  The  lawyer  thinks  that  Rawls  is
saying, just  as countless  lawyers  say,  that  we  should  be  wary  about
giving constitutional-legal  status  to norms  whose  ranges  of arguably
correct  application  are  so  wide  and  whose  correct  applications
therefore  are  so  contestable,  so  opaque  to  demonstrably  correct
resolution,  that  these  norms  cannot  credibly  be  imposed  by judicial
bodies  on  differently  minded  legislative  bodies  without  undue
disturbance  to the  relations  of mutual  respect  that  ought  to  subsist
between  the two classes of bodies.45  Now, if that indeed is the worry,
or one of them,46 leading Rawls  to divide  the substantive  demands  of
justice  into those  that  are  and are  not constitutional  essentials,  then
Rawls  at  this stage  of his  argument  is  presupposing  judicial  review's
existence.  But such an assumption  seemingly runs counter to Rawls's
42.  See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra note 41,  at 352-58.
43.  See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 229-30.
44.  Id.
45.  For  a  measured,  representative  discussion,  see  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Designing
Democracy: What Constitutions Do 223-24 (2001).
46.  In  fact,  I  believe  there  is  a  further  worry  about  transparency  that  holds
without  regard  to  expectations  about judicial  review.  See  Michelman,  Constitutional
Law, supra  note 4,  at 404-06; infra Part III.B.
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avowals  that justice  as  fairness  does  not  contain  an  answer  to  the
question  of judicial  review  but  rather  leaves  that  question  open  to
pragmatic  calculations  whose  results  may  vary  across  national
systems.  Thus, our first puzzle.  Why reject a certified prerequisite for
justice  from  the  prerequisites  for  legitimacy  just  because  that
particular prerequisite is ill-suited to a practice-judicial review-that
neither  justice  nor  legitimacy  requires?  (Why  not  rather  dispense
with or hem in judicial review?)
C.  The Second Puzzle
Whether  out  of  a  concern  about  justiciability  or  for  some  other
reason,  Rawls  plainly  does  hold  that  excessive  difficulty  in
ascertaining the fulfillment of a justice norm, or in securing agreement
on that  question,  is  a  reason to omit that norm from  the  package  of
constitutional essentials  that sets  the conditions  of legitimacy for  the
governmental  order,  according  to the  liberal  principle  of legitimacy.
Yet he seems to maintain  this stance  inconstantly.  Without apparent
hesitation,  Rawls  includes  among  the  constitutional  essentials  a
requirement  that  the  political  liberties  of  everyone  be  guaranteed
their "fair value."47  "Fair value"  of the political liberties  means  that
everyone,  regardless  of  social  or  economic  position,  has  a  "fair
opportunity  to  hold  public  office  and  to  influence  the  outcome  of
political  decisions,"  and  Rawls  thinks  it  clear  that  a  political  order
lacking  such  a  commitment  would  not  be  rationally  acceptable  to
every  reasonable  inhabitant  of  a  constitutional-democratic  political
culture.48  Fair value plainly  is  a  distributional  norm,  and judgments
regarding  its  satisfaction  seem  open  to  the  sorts  of  obscurities  and
uncertainties that Rawls says attach generally to judgments  regarding
fair opportunity as well as to judgments under the difference principle
regarding which policies will and which  will not improve  the prospects
of the least advantaged. 49
At  least  as  strikingly,  Rawls  explicitly  includes  among  the
constitutional  essentials  the  guarantee  of  what  he  calls  a  "social
minimum"  providing  for  satisfaction  of  citizens'  "basic"  material
needs  insofar  as  required  to  enable  them  to  take  effective  part  in
political and social life.5"  The pressure such guarantees create toward
over-extension  of  the  judicial  role  have  been  very  widely  noticed.
47.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 338.
48.  Id. at 327-28.
49.  For example, what does fair value of the  political  liberties demand  in the way
of  equalization  of  the  resources  available  for  a  person's  primary  and  secondary
education?  See,  e.g.,  San  Antonio Indep. Sch.  Dist. v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1, 111-17
(1972)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting);  Amy  Gutmann,  Democratic  Education  136-48
(1987).
50.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 7,  166, 228-29.
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How,  then,  can  Rawls  include  it  as  a  constitutional  essential  while
excluding fair equality of opportunity?  That is the second puzzle.
III.  ANSWERS
A.  Assuming Justiciability  is the Driving Concern
These puzzles are easy, hardly puzzles  at all.  Both yield to a  single
solution, which proceeds in two stages.  At the first stage,  we assume
that  a  difference  in  degrees  of  justiciability  is  the  only  difference
Rawls  sees  between  basic-liberty  guarantees  and  distributional
guarantees, leading him to conclude that the former but not the latter
belong  among  the  constitutional  essentials.  On  that  assumption,
Rawls's  claim  is  that  the  relative  non-justiciability  of  distributional
norms of justice is a factor to be considered  in constitution-writing,  in
case the relevant  considerations  otherwise  weigh  strongly  in favor  of
judicial review.
We  imagine  a  chooser,  a  constitution-writer,  whose  choices
presumably are governed by the pursuit of the political  conception  of
justice  as  fairness.  Any  choice  in  favor  of judicial  review  thus  will
reflect a set of considerations that figure as reasons from within justice
as fairness.  We  have already  noticed in  a rough  way what might  be
the justice-sourced  reasons for choosing for or against judicial review.
Against  such  a  choice,  there  would  be  weighing  a  concern  that  by
committing decisions regarding the demands of justice upon politics to
an electorally unaccountable  judiciary, we compromise the equality-
the fair value-of  political  liberty.  We  cramp  the  development  and
exercise of the  rank-and-file's  capacities  for  a  sense of justice. 1  On
the other side of the balance would be weighing beliefs that legitimacy
depends on both the aptness to justice and the public credibility of the
applied  meanings  attributed  to  the  constitutional  essentials,  the
meanings  they  acquire  in  the  crucible  of  live  political  practice,  and
that  independent  judiciaries  are  better  able  than  ordinary  political
bodies  to  produce  apt  and  credible  resolutions.  So  even  granting
judicial  review's  detraction  from  the  fair  value  of  political  liberty,
judicial review  still might-although  it also might not-be found on-
balance favorable  to the aim of realizing the most fully adequate total
scheme of basic liberties that is practically within reach.
Suppose that  the foregoing  is  roughly, in  a nutshell,  the Rawlsian
justice-sourced  argument for (or against) judicial review.  Suppose we
have  a  constitution-writer  who,  accepting  this  framework,  estimates
that the net contributions  of judicial  review to legitimacy  will be very
great, but only as long as highly non-ascertainahle  norms are kept out
51.  See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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of the judicially enforceable  parts of the constitution. 52  In such a case,
might  not  the  writer  prudently  presume  against  including  any  such
norms in the constitution?  Might she not prudently decide to exclude
all  such  norms  except  those,  if  there  are  any, whose  inclusion  is  so
crucial  to  legitimacy  as  to  overcome  losses  owing  to  damaged  or
forgone judicial review,  which will attend  their inclusion?  Rawls, we
may  infer,  believes  that neither  fair  equality  of opportunity  nor the
difference  principle rises to that level of urgency.  It is "more urgent,"
he writes (plainly with legitimacy in view),  that "the  essentials dealing
with  the  basic  freedoms"  be  settled  by  constitutional  law.53  Given
"firm  agreement"  on  these  essentials  along  with  fair-seeming,
recognizably  democratic  political  procedures,  "willing  political  and
social  cooperation  between  free and  equal  persons  can  normally  be
maintained" 54-or,  in other words, legitimacy is sufficiently served.
This  answer to  the first puzzle  points  directly to an answer  to the
second.  Rawls,  we  are  assuming  for  the  moment,  believes  that
justiciability  (suitability to enforcement by judges) makes a difference
that counts in deciding which of the requirements of justice as fairness
should  and  should  not  be  classed  as  constitutional  essentials,  or,  in
other  words,  which  should  and  should  not  be  written  into
constitutional  law.  But  to  believe  that  justiciability  does  always
matter  for this  choice  is  not necessarily  to believe  that  justiciability
always-or  ever!-is  the  only  consideration  that  matters.  Another
that does, as we have just seen, is that of urgency  in relation to liberal
legitimacy.  In Rawls's view,  a  graphic guarantee  that everyone  shall
enjoy  the  fair  value  of  the  political  liberties  is,  in  fact,  urgently
required for  the legitimacy  of any system for the  exercise  of political
power,55  and  likewise,  apparently,  for  the  assurance  that  everyone's
basic  material  needs  are  met.  The  urgency  factor  that  applies  to
assurances  regarding  the  basic  liberties  also  applies  to  these  two
distributional  assurances.  That observation  argues for giving  both of
them  some  expression  in  constitutional  law,  even  if  at  the  cost  of
involving  courts  in  decisions  of  a  kind  for  which  they  are  not
especially  well  suited.  (Alternatively,  the  result may  be  that courts
forbear to judge beyond the bounds of their competence  and we wind
up  having  some  constitutional  rights  that  are  judicially  "under-
enforced,"  a  situation  that  Lawrence  Sager  argues  convincingly  we
can live with.)56
52.  For what  is meant here  by  "non-ascertainable,"  see supra text accompanying
notes 44-45.
53.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 230.
54.  Id.
55.  Id. at 299, 327-29.
56.  See Lawrence  G. Sager,  The Why of Constitutional  Essentials, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 1421,  1424-26 (2004).
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B.  Justiciability  Aside
To  this  point,  we  have  assumed  that  when  Rawls  points  out  the
relative  non-ascertainability  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity  and  the
difference principle, 7 he is making a point about justiciability or over-
extension  of  the  judicial  role.  It  is  only  on  the  basis  of  that
assumption  that  any  tension  at  all  can  be  found  between  Rawls's
exclusion of those two requirements of justice from the constitutional
essentials  and  his  professed  agnosticism  regarding  judicial  review.
That assumption,  however, is highly questionable.  Rawls has reasons
for  concern  about  the  relative  ascertainability  of  constitutional
essentials that are non-dependent  on judicial  review and stem directly
from the liberal principle of legitimacy.58
Recall the crucial place of the idea of constitutional essentials in the
liberal principle  of legitimacy. 9  These  selected  features of the  basic
structure  are  to  bear  the  full  weight  of  legitimation  in  the  first
instance.  The  stated prerequisite  to the  moral  supportability  of  the
legal  coercion  emanating from  the structure  is  that all such  coercion
should  be  constrained  by  an  aptly  selected  set  of  constitutional
essentials.  Only on that condition  may the  structure  and  its coercive
authority be rationally acceptable to all reasonable  citizens.  It follows
that,  in deciding  which  basic features  of a  regime  are  and which are
not to be regarded  as constitutional essentials,  we have to avoid errors
not only of under-inclusion, but also of over-inclusion.
Omission  of  one  or  another  item  from  the  list  of  those  placed
beyond  the  tender  mercies  of majorities-liberty  of  conscience,  for
example-may  render  the  regime  not  rationally  acceptable  to  the
reasonable.  That  would  be  the  error  of  under-inclusion,  and  it  is
obvious.  Perhaps  less  obvious  is  what  risk  we  might  pose  to
legitimacy  by placing  in the category of constitutional  essentials each
and  every  dimension  of political  justice  upon which  rational  citizens
reasonably would insist.  If (as in justice as fairness)  a commitment to
the difference  principle  is held to be such a dimension,  what possibly
can  be  hazardous  to  legitimacy  in  writing  that  commitment  into
constitutional law?  A part of the answer  is "non-transparency."
Consider  that, in  a Rawlsian  view,  I can  willingly  accept  the  daily
run of coercive  acts from a constituted regime, despite my reasonable
moral and prudential  aversion to many of them, as long (but only  as
long)  as  two  conditions  are  satisfied:  (1)  I  regard  this  regime  as
universally  reasonably  acceptable  by  the  rational,  and  (2)  I  see  my
fellow citizens  abiding  by it.  But  this conjunction  of perceptions  is
possible for me only if I can at all times see what the regime actually is
57.  See supra text accompanying note 44.
58.  The  following  explanation  is  taken  from  Michelman,  Constitutional Law,
supra note 4, at 404-06.
59.  See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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that my fellow citizens are abiding by, so that I can check whether that
regime,  the  one  actually  in  force,  does  in  fact  meet  the  test  of
universal  reasonable  and  rational  acceptability.  (That  is  why
interpreters, as Rawls says, must always be seen to be interpreting one
and  the  same  constitution.)60  Now  since,  according  to  Rawls,  the
regime's  acceptability  to  me  is  given  in  the  first  instance  by  its
incorporation of correct  settings for a certain, minimal set of required
features-the  constitutional  essentials-then  (if  the  fact  of  this
incorporation  is to be at all times observable  by me)  the requirements
in the minimal set had better not be too opaque to a compliance check
by reason of technical complexity of application.  Such considerations
plainly  enter  into  Rawls's  view  that  basic  liberty  rights  can  be
constitutional essentials while the difference principle cannot.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Rawls's responses to the judicial  review question  and closely related
matters are pragmatic  ones guided  by the moral content of justice  as
fairness.  That is a  merely exegetical and stylistic conclusion.  Beyond
it  lie  some  hard  and  deep  substantive  questions,  chiefly  whether
Rawls's  constitution-centered  theory  of  normative  legitimacy  is  a
good one.  Those questions are for another day.  The task for this day
has been that of getting clear what the theory is,  especially as it bears
upon the question of judicial review.
60.  Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 237.
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